OMEGA — Key Derivation and Peer Attestation
Summary
An archived implementation note describing changes to key derivation and peer attestation after two internal findings.
Document record
- Author
- Eduardo Camarillo [Noir0x63]
- Published
- Version
- v1.0
- Language
- English
Issues under review
The earlier design coupled key material too closely across purposes and did not bind peer attestation as clearly as intended. That combination made the security argument difficult to audit and increased the impact of mistakes in transcript handling.
Design changes
The revised design separated password stretching from session-key expansion, using PBKDF2 for the password-derived input and HKDF labels for distinct protocol contexts. Peer attestation was moved to asymmetric ECDSA signatures over a defined transcript rather than relying on shared-secret assertions.
These changes improve key separation and make the claimed identity binding more explicit. They do not, on their own, prove forward secrecy or protect a compromised endpoint.
Verification boundary
The note records the implementation state reviewed at the time. Independent cryptographic review, transcript-level test vectors and platform testing would be required before treating the construction as suitable for production use.