AmEx Phishing Operation — Incident Response Record
Notification status: provider notification and case outcome are not asserted in this record.
No affiliation with American Express. The trademark is used descriptively to identify the impersonated brand.
Summary
Defensive investigation of an American Express phishing campaign covering the delivery chain, kit, C2, evidence limits and response actions.
Document record
- Author
- Eduardo Camarillo [Noir0x63]
- Published
- Version
- v2.2
- Language
- English
Defensive incident-response record for an active campaign impersonating American Express. The investigation documents observed infrastructure and behavior without claiming a physical operator identity.
Scope and method
The work combined passive HTTP and DNS observation, static analysis of captured HTML, public certificate and archive records, hash comparison and synthetic canary requests. No real victim data was submitted, the web shell was not operated, and no RDP, MySQL or private panel access was attempted.
The evidence snapshot is dated 20 October 2026. Historical counts are preserved where useful, but the current IOC source is the consolidated v2.2 record: 35 R2 objects, 17 observed as live and 18 returning Cloudflare's phishing interstitial.
Campaign chain
t.co link → compromised legitimate host → Cloudflare R2 loader → AmEx-branded BlobPhish kit → annnafi.com/wp-admin/avalon/res.php The first hop uses trusted platforms and compromised sites to hide the final landing page. The R2 object contains a Base64 loader that reconstructs the kit in a blob: URL. This is an infrastructure and delivery observation, not evidence that the legitimate site owners participated in the campaign.
What the kit collects
Static analysis of the decoded stage confirms a staged flow for membership credentials, card identifiers, CSC, personal data, PIN, security questions and SMS or email OTP. Each stage posts to the same collector and polls panel.php for the next instruction.
The collector response proves receipt at the HTTP endpoint. It does not prove how the server stores, forwards or later retrieves the submitted data.
Infrastructure layers
| Layer | Observed role | Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Redirectors | 144-byte HTML redirects on legitimate domains | Compromised hosts or paths; owner involvement unproven |
| R2 | Repeated copies of the same loader and alternate C2 variant | Campaign distribution layer; 17 live objects in the snapshot |
| Observed endpoint | annnafi.com on 65.109.89.227 | Observed collector and polling endpoint. Ownership not determined; consistent with a compromised host. Not suitable as a campaign-exclusive block target; storage unknown. |
| Web shell | F35/WSO interface under a compromised IIS path | Unauthenticated interface observed; capability not exercised |
Evidence and attribution
The captured loader and decoded stage are byte-identical across the observed R2 copies. The shell branding is consistent with the AnonymousFox/F35 ecosystem, but that identifies a commodity access layer rather than the phishing operator. Public registration and hosting records associate the domain with a third party that appears to be a compromised host. The evidence remains compatible with either a compromised victim environment or an operator-controlled deployment.
No individual is attributed. The analyst egress address reflected by the panel is not an actor IOC and must not be blocklisted as one.
Response actions
- Preserve provider logs and host images before destructive cleanup, especially for the C2 and compromised IIS hosts.
- Report the live R2 objects, collector and redirector URLs to the relevant providers with the captured hashes and timestamps.
- Notify likely victim site owners and handle any real AmEx submissions through the established fraud-response process.
- Keep the evidence package hash-bound and separate synthetic canaries from any future victim evidence.
Draft reports in the working case file are not proof of submission. Provider ticket numbers and preservation results must be added before claiming takedown or legal preservation.
Limits and open questions
- The server-side sink, retention period and any external forwarding remain unverified.
- Attribution to a person or organization requires provider logs, account records or a forensic image obtained through the appropriate process.
- The record describes the 20 October snapshot; infrastructure can rotate after publication.